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INTRODUCTION
tate non-claim statutes, those that bar creditors' claims against the
decedent's estate if not presented within a legislatively defined
period, seek to preserve finality.' Probate administration generally is
designed "to pass good title in the decedent's assets .... and allow
distributions free of potential creditor claims."2 States employ non-claim
statutes to encourage efficient settlement of estates by timely informing the
administrators of all claims.3 According to one source, "[t]he purpose of
nonclaim provisions of a probate code is to facilitate the administration of
estates, the payment of creditors of the estate probated, and the distribution
of assets." The important interest in closing a decedent's estate and
transferring the residue to the distributees may, however, implicate
concerns for the due process rights of creditors who had no actual
knowledge of the decedent's death.5 This due process interest was
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Tulsa Professional
' Bruce N. Kness, Note, Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope: New
Due Process Requirements for Decedent's Creditors-Adios Publication Notice,
34 S.D. L. REv. 359, 365 (1989).2Id.
3E.g., Nathanson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 525 P.2d 687,694
(Cal. 1974).
4 31 AM. JUR. 2D Executors and Administrators § 565 (2002).
'See Tulsa Prof 1 Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
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Collection Services v. Pope6 where it held that publication notice of a non-
self-executing statute of limitations is insufficient to satisfy constitutional
due process requirements.7
In light of the decision in Pope, many states have altered their statutes
in order to accommodate this due process command This Note takes the
position that Kentucky's non-claim statutes9 do not comport with the due
process mandate set forth in Pope and may subject decedents' estates to
uncertainty with regard to the finality of a possible claim by creditors of
said estates. Clear and concise legislative revision that takes into account
the holding in Pope and state court interpretations of it will remedy the
possibility of creditor suits against the decedent's estate being allowed after
the deadlines established by the state legislature. While some analysis of
the decision in Pope and the constitutional doctrine upon which it was
founded will be necessary in order to frame the issue, it is not the objective
of this Note to provide a detailed analysis of the Pope decision, or its
precedent and historical underpinnings, as the theoretical basis and
Supreme Court rationale used in Pope have been thoroughly discussed in
numerous publications.' This Note seeks to recognize the mandates of
Pope, analyze the Pope Court's state court interpretations, and review the
state statutory revisions in light of Pope in order to recommend revisions
to Kentucky's statutory scheme. The Note contends that Kentucky's
statutory scheme is currently insufficient to conform to the Pope mandate.
6Id.
7 Id. at 491 ("We hold that Oklahoma's nonclaim statute is not a self-executing
statute of limitations.... Thus, if appellant's identity as a creditor was known or
'reasonably ascertainable,' then the Due Process Clause requires that appellant be
given 'notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice. "') (citation
omitted).
8 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-1(d) (Michie Supp. 2001); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2117.06(B) (Anderson 1998).
9While there are some provisions that are found in other areas, Kentucky's non-
claim statutes are generally found in Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter
K.R.S.] ch. 396. For the purposes of this Note, the primary statutory provisions are
K.R.S. § 396.011 and K.R.S. § 396.205.
" For a more detailed analysis of Pope and its doctrinal rationale, see generally,
e.g., John W. Chapman, Jr., Note, Probate Nonclaim Statutes and the Tulsa
Decision: Requiring Actual Notice to Reasonably Ascertainable Creditors, 18
STETSON L. REv. 471 (1989); Kness, supra note 1, at 359-60; Nicole Losacco,
Note, Probate: Notice to Estate Creditors: The Effect of Tulsa Professional
Collection Services v. Pope, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 325 (1989); Thomas L. Waterbury,
Notice to Decedents' Creditors, 73 MINN. L. REv. 763 (1989).
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I. SUPREME COURT CASES GIVING RISE TO THE POPE DECISION
A. Mullane and the Supreme Court's Acknowledgement of an Actual
Notice Requirementfor a Known or ReasonablyAscertainable Plaintiff
The foundation of the principle that there is a due process notice
requirement to "known or reasonably ascertainable" creditors was
established through Supreme Court precedent prior to Pope." In Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust," the defendant, in compliance with
statutory mandates, offered only publication notice in connection with its
settlement of a common trust fund.'3 It was clear from the record that many
of the trust beneficiaries were not residents of the state of New York, where
the trust was established and where publication notice was given. 4 The
Supreme Court held that publication notice alone, as required by New York
law for judicial settlement of accounts, was a violation of property rights
without due process of law 5 in contravention of the plaintiff's Fourteenth
Amendment rights.16'Mullane stood for the proposition that, with regard to
those beneficiaries whose whereabouts cannot be ascertained with due
diligence, publication notice is sufficient. 7 However, where the beneficia-
ries do not fit into the above category, the Court held that "notice by
publication stands on a different footing"'" and is "not reasonably cal-
culated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at
hand." 9
B. Mennonite as an Impetus for the Pope Decision
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,2" the Supreme Court
entertained a suit regarding an individual whose house was sold at a state
"See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983); Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
' Mullane, 339 U.S. at 306.
13 Id. at 309-10.
14 Id. at 309.
'5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
'6 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320.
"Id. at 317.
'Id. at 318.
9 Id. at 319.20Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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tax sale for deficiencies in property tax payments.2 The plaintiff did not
receive actual notice of the tax sale.22 The notice, however, was given by
way of publication in compliance with statutory obligations.23 The Court
found that "actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a
proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of
any party... if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable."24 Since
the plaintiff in Mennonite could have been identified through "reasonably
diligent efforts," the Court held that due process required actual notice.25
II. POPE'S MANDATE REGARDING
NOTICE TO KNOWN OR REASONABLY ASCERTAINABLE CREDITORS
A. The Background of Pope
The above two cases, Mullane26 and Mennonite,7 provided the impetus
for the holding in Pope.2" In Pope, the decedent's personal representative
furnished notice in compliance with the terms of the non-claim statute of
the state of Oklahoma and the creditor did not file its claim within the
statutorily required time period.29 The statute at issue in Pope required only
that the decedent's personal representative give publication notice in a
newspaper located in the county once per week for two consecutive
weeks.3° In addition, if notice was supplied in the above manner, a
"creditor's failure to file a claim within the 2-month period generally bars
it forever."'', The Court pronounced that the notice required by this statute
did not conform with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment when applied to "known or reasonably ascertain-
able creditors. 32 It therefore held that actual notice is mandated by the
21 Id. at 794.
22 Id.
23 id.
24 Id. at 800.
2S Id. at 798 n.4.
26 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
27 Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 791.
2 Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 482 (1988).
29 Id. at 482. The plaintiff, Tulsa Professional Collection Services, was the
assignee of a hospital claim for payment of expenses in connection with the
decedent's hospitalization prior to death. Id.
30 Id. at 481.
3' Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 331 (1981)).
321Id. at 491.
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Constitution with respect to such known or reasonably ascertainable
creditors.
33
B. The State Action Requirement
An elementary principle of constitutional law is that the Fourteenth
Amendment is a prohibition on state activity and thus due process is not
implicated unless there is a state action rather than merely an action of a
private citizen.34 However, the Court determined that the fact pattern in
Pope illustrated "significant state action," and therefore a due process
concern was present.3' The Supreme Court opined in Pope that the crucial
factor in determining if a state non-claim statute contains sufficient state
action to trigger due process is whether the statute of limitations is self-
executing. The Court distinguished self-executing and non-self-executing
statutes of limitations by holding that in the case of self-executing statutes
of limitations:
The State has no role to play beyond enactment of the limitations period.
While this enactment obviously is state action, the State's limited
involvement in the running of the time period generally falls short of
constituting the type of state action required to implicate the protections
of the Due Process Clause.
36
Unlike the triggering of a statute by a state-sponsored event, such as a
probate court proceeding, a self-executing statute extinguishes the
plaintiff's claim by operation of law.37
33 Id. The Court went on to state:
As the Court indicated in Mennonite, all that the executor or executrix need
do is make 'reasonably diligent efforts' to uncover the identities of
creditors. For creditors who are not 'reasonably ascertainable,' publication
notice can suffice. Nor is everyone who may conceivably have a claim
properly considered a creditor entitled to actual notice. Here, as in Mullane,
it is reasonable to dispense with actual notice to those with mere 'conjec-
tural' claims.
Id. at 490 (citations omitted).
34 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 926 (1998).
" Pope, 485 U.S. at 487 (describing the appointment of an executor by the
probate court as an "involvement... so pervasive and substantial that it must be
considered state action subject to the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment").
36Id. at 486-87.
37Id. at 486.
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C. Non Self-Executing Statutes of Limitations Give Rise to State Action
and Implicate Due Process
Unlike the limited state involvement the Court perceived in a self-
executing statute of limitations, a non-self-executing statute of limitations,
such as the Oklahoma statute at issue in Pope, includes "significant state
action" that gives rise to due process concerns. 38 "Where the legal
proceedings themselves trigger the time bar, even if those proceedings do
not necessarily resolve the claim on its merits, the time bar lacks the self-
executing feature... necessary to remove any due process problem. 39
Because the two-month limitations period in Pope began to run after a
personal representative was appointed by the probate court and notice was
given, the probate court was "intimately involved throughout, and without
that involvement the time bar is never activated." ° The state action results
because it is "[o]nly after this court appointment is made [that] the statute
provide[s] for any notice."' Therefore, the Pope decision seems to base its
holding on the premise that a limitations period triggered by a legal
proceeding is a sufficient state action to afford known or reasonably
ascertainable creditors due process protection.
Ill. STATE COURT APPLICATIONS OF POPE
A. Invalidated Statutes
After the interpretation of the Due Process Clause to require actual
notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors, several creditors who
were similarly situated to the plaintiff in Pope brought suits asserting that
they were not afforded due process by the publication notice required by
state statutes similar to the one considered in Pope. For instance, the
Kansas Supreme Court applied the Pope decision retroactively.42 In In re
McDowell, the four-month non-claim limitations period expired for the
31 Id. at 487.
39 Id.
' Id. ("The nonclaim statute becomes operative only after probate proceedings
have been commenced in state court.").
41 Id.
42 In re Estate of McDowell, 777 P.2d 826 (Kan. 1989). But see Hanesworth v.
Johnke, 783 P.2d 173 (Wyo. 1989). The Hanesworth court followed the general
principle of Pope but held that the Pope decision did not apply retroactively to
probate proceedings that were finalized prior to the holding in Pope. Id. at 177.
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decedent's estate on February 22, 1988."1 However, after the Pope decision
on April 19, 1988, the creditor filed a petition the following day, seeking
allowance of the claim against the decedent's estate." In upholding the
decision of a lower court to allow the claim, the Kansas Supreme Court
held that due process was not satisfied through the publication notice and
that since the Kansas statute and the Oklahoma statute considered in Pope
were nearly identical, Pope mandated that the claim should be allowed,
even after the statutory time bar, to the known or reasonably ascertainable
creditor who was not afforded actual notice. 5
In 1991, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a case with facts
strikingly similar to those in Pope.' In In re Estate ofBarthel, the decedent
died on August 4, 1988, and on September 13, 1988, pursuant to Wisconsin
statute, the probate court entered an order that all creditors' claims would
be barred if not filed within three months.47 The personal representative
complied with the statutory mandate of publication notice.48 Over five
months later, Sears, Roebuck and Company filed a claim against the
decedent's estate for $6,522.73.4' In reversing a lower court, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held, pursuant to the mandate in Pope, that the Wisconsin
statutory notice provision did not afford due process protection to the
appellant, who was a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor.50 Noting
that the Wisconsin statute was very similar in form tothe statute at issue in
Pope, the court held that "[a]s in Pope, these statutes require significant
state involvement in triggering the operation of the time limitation and the
notice proceedings."'"
B. Validated Statutes
In cases involving a state non-claim statute that is nearly identical to
the one considered in Pope, courts have easily invalidated the state statutes
43 McDowell, 777 P.2d at 828.
" Id.
45Id.
4In re Estate of Barthel, 468 N.W.2d 689 (Wis. 1991).
47 Id. at 692 (citing WLS. STAT. §§ 859.05, .07, 879.05(4) (1987-88)). These
sections provided that on application for administration, the court, by order, shall
determine a deadline date for claims filed against the decedent's estate. Id.
41 Barthel, 468 N.W.2d at 690.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 693.
' Id. at 692.
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as violations of Pope's due process mandate.52 However, the more difficult
and interesting question is how a non-claim statute may be drafted in order
to satisfy Pope's requirements. This interpretation issue was presented to
the Ohio Court of Appeals in Fifth ThirdBankv. Gottlieb.53 In Gottlieb, the
bank presented a claim against the decedent's estate that was not timely
filed under the Ohio non-claim statute.' In rejecting the appeal of the
creditor, which argued it was known or reasonably ascertainable and
entitled to actual notice under Pope, the court held that the Ohio statute was
self-executing and therefore not subject to the requirements of Pope.55 In
its analysis of Ohio's statute, the court made a critical distinction between
the Ohio statute and the one subject to controversy in Pope. It found that
in the Ohio statute:
the decedent's death is the event that triggers the running of the time
period for filing claims against the estate.56 Therefore, we find that under
the Tulsa analysis, there is no state action involved and Ohio's statute is
a self-executing statute of limitations. Thus, the due process clause is not
applicable.57
Gottlieb illustrates the typical state court treatment of non-claim
statutes that run from the death of the decedent, rather than from a court
order, as being self-executing and not subject to the due process re-
quirements of Pope. In Burnett v. Villaneuve,5" the Indiana Court of
Appeals endorsed a similar type of analysis. The Indiana non-claim sta-
52 See generally In re Estate of McDowell, 777 P.2d 826 (Kan. 1989) (holding
that Pope applied.retroactively to invalidate a non-claim statute that did not require
that actual notice be given to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors);
Barthell, 468 N.W.2d at 689 (holding that a non-self-executing non-claim statute
was unconstitutional insofar as it did not require actual notice to a known or
reasonably ascertainable creditor).
" Fifth Third Bank v. Gottlieb, No. WD-96-054, 1997 WL 543069 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 27, 1997).
54 Id. at *2.
551 Id. at * 1-2.
56 Id. at *2 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.06 (Anderson 1998)). See also
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.06(B) ("All claims shall be presented within one
year after the death of the decedent, whether or not the estate is released from
administration or an executor or administrator is appointed during that one-year
period. Every claim presented shall set forth the claimant's address.").
5 Gottlieb, 1997 WL 543069, at *2.
58 Burnett v. Villaneuve, 685 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
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tute59 required that, in order to institute a claim against a decedent's estate,
the claim must be presented within one year of the decedent's death.' °
Therefore, the court reasoned, the involvement of the state in enacting the
statute of limitations was insufficient to trigger a due process concern." In
support of this proposition, the court cited language from Pope that
reasoned" 'the State's involvement in the mere running of a general statute
of limitations [is not] generally sufficient to implicate due process.' "62
Thus the Burnett Court held that, with respect to a one-year non-claim
limitations period that runs from the time of the decedent's death,
publication notice would be sufficient even to creditors who were known
or reasonably ascertainable. 3
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH KENTUCKY'S NON-CLAIM STATUTES
A. The Last Revision of Chapter 396
As previously mentioned, the statutory provisions governing Ken-
tucky's non-claim limitations periods are principally found in Kentucky
Revised Statutes ("K.R.S.") Chapter 396.' This chapter was last amended
in 1988,65 only a short time after the Pope decision was handed down by
the United States Supreme Court. It is unfortunate that the last revisions in
Kentucky took place within a few short months of the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Pope,' which pronounced an interpretation of the
Due Process Clause at odds with many state statutes. 7 Without the benefit
I91d. at 1106 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-1(d) (Michie Supp. 2001) ("All
claims barrable under subsection (a) shall be barred if not filed within one (1) year
after the death of the decedent.")).
60Id. at 1112.
61Id. at 1111.
'2 Id. (quoting Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485-86
(1988)).
631Id. at 1112.
"For an excellent discussion of all aspects of claims against decedents' estates
in Kentucky, including litigation pursuant to it, see generally G. Cliff Stidham,
Litigation Aspects of the Claims Statute, ESTATE LITIGATION IN KENTUCKY (Univ.
of Ky. Continuing Legal Educ. 2001).
65 The revisions to K.R.S. ch. 396 took effect on July 15, 1988.
"The court decided Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope on April 19, 1988.
67 See In re Estate of McDowell, 777 P.2d 826, 828 (Kan. 1989) (holding a state
statute unconstitutional under Pope); In re Estate of Barthel, 468 N.W.2d 689, 691
(Wis. 1991) (noting that the then existing statutory scheme was insufficient to
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of time to adequately examine the holding in Pope or to analyze subsequent
state court interpretations of it, the latest amendments to Kentucky's non-
claim statutes contain serious flaws. These flaws could circumvent the
intention of the legislature to obtain an expeditious settlement of an estate
and distribute property to the distributees free from potential creditor
claims after the statutorily defined time period.
B. Kentucky's Non-Claim Provisions
Kentucky law mandates that creditors be given publication notice,6" in
a qualifying newspaper,69 of the appointment of the decedent's personal
representative and the amount of time creditors have to file a claim against
the decedent's estate.70 Furthermore, the statute requires the clerk of the
probate court to publish such notice on a monthly basis at minimum.7 ' The
most important non-claim limitations period appears in K.R.S. § 396.011 72
This section requires that claims arising before the decedent's death and not
barred by another statute of limitations must be: 1) Presented within six
months of the appointment of the personal representative; or 2) Within two
years of the death of the decedent where no personal representative is
appointed.73 In addition to the limitations period in K.R.S. § 396.011, this
chapter also includes a provision intended to be a "catch all" limitations
period. 4 K.R.S. § 396.205 provides that if a cause of action against a
decedent's estate is notbarred by any other applicable statute of limitations,
including K.R.S. § 396.011, it may not be brought against the personal
representative or any distributee "after the expiration of two (2) years from
the date of the order of discharge of the personal representative. 75
protect the due process right of creditors as interpreted in Pope).
6 K.R.S. § 424.340 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 2001). The statute requires the clerk
of the probate court to publish "a notice setting forth all fiduciary appointments
made since the last publication and including at least the following information: the
name and address of the decedent or ward, the name and address of the fiduciary,
the date of the fiduciary's appointment, and the name and address of the attorney
representing the fiduciary, if any, and the date by which claims of creditors must
be presented." Id.
6 The requirements for a newspaper to be sufficient for the purpose of publi-
cation notice are set forth in K.R.S. § 424.120.
70 Id.
71 Id. § 424.340.
721 Id. § 396.011 (Michie 1999).
73Id.
74 Id. § 396.205.
75 Id.
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C. The Potential Difficulties of Kentucky Law in Light ofPope
An analysis of Kentucky's non-claim statutes reveals several potential
problems in the event it is subjected to a Pope attack. First, the only
statutory notice mandate is through publication.76 A personal representative
who does not obtain adequate counsel to inform her of the potential
problem of complying with all statutory mandates and, being unaware of
Pope's actual notice requirement to "known or reasonably ascertainable"
creditors, may inadvertently subject the estate to creditors' claims after the
limitations period has expired." In addition, the limitations period barring
claims not presented to the decedent's personal representative within six
months of the representative's appointment7" is, according to the definition
in Pope and other court cases,79 not self-executing. This is because, as in
Pope, "legal proceedings themselves trigger the time bar.""0
D. The Limitations Periods ofKR.S. § 396.011
Since K.R.S. § 396.011 promulgates two distinct limitations periods,
it is important to distinguish between them. One provision provides that
where a personal representative is not appointed, claims will be barred
unless brought against the decedent's estate within two years of the
decedent's death.8' This provision will likely survive a due process attack
from a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor who did not receive
actual notice because of the line of state court cases holding that a statute
triggered at the death of the decedent is self-executing and that in such
cases there is insufficient state action to implicate due process.8 2 However,
76 Id. § 424.340.
7 See, e.g., In re Estate of Barthel, 468 N.W.2d 689 (Wis. 1991); In re Estate
of McDowell, 777 P.2d 826 (Kan. 1989). In these cases the statutory notice
shortcomings prevented the desired legislative time limit from barring a claim that
was filed after this time period. McDowell, 777 P.2d at 830; Barthel, 468 N.W.2d
at 690.
7 K.R.S. § 396.011.
9 See McDowell, 777 P.2d at 828; Barthel, 468 N.W.2d at 692.
Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 487 (1988).
s' K.R.S. § 396.011(1).
82 See Bumettv. Villaneuve, 685 N.E.2d 1103, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) ("[A]
self-executing statute of limitation, as opposed to a nonclaim statute triggered by
the significant assistance of state officials, is not unconstitutional.") (citing Pope,
485 U.S. at 486); Fifth Third Bank v. Gottlieb, No. WD-96-054, 1997 WL 543069,
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1997) ("[T]he decedent's death is the event that
triggers the running of the time period for filing claims against the estate.
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the portion of the statute imposing a six-month presentation requirement
from the date of the appointment of a personal representative83 would
clearly be analogous to the statute in Pope. The estate therefore may be
subject to a claim (well after the limitations period has run) by a creditor
who did not receive actual notice.
E. KR.S. § 396.205 and its Difficulties
Perhaps the most troublesome effect of this potential "loophole" in the
six-month rule of K.R.S. § 396.011 is its potential effect when combined
with K.R.S. § 396.205. As mentioned earlier, where no personal representa-
tive is appointed, Kentucky has a self-executing statute of limitations that
bars claims not brought within two years of the decedent's death., Another
Kentucky statute attempts to put an absolute limitation on any claim,
whether it arose before or after the decedent's death. K.R.S. § 396.205
requires that claims be brought within two years "from the date of the order
of discharge of the personal representative."85 It is unfortunate that the
Kentucky legislature chose to commence this limitations period from the
date of the personal representative's order of discharge and not from the
date of decedent's death. While a statute triggered by the death of the
decedent is self-executing and not subject to the Pope requirements,86
electing that the statute be triggered by court proceedings subjects it to the
argument that the statute is not self-executing and a "known or reasonably
ascertainable" creditor could attack it on due process grounds.87 However,
while this conceptually appears to be correct, Pope governed a so-called
"short-term" statute, similar to the six-month rule of K.R.S. § 396.011,
rather than the so-called "long-term" statutes of limitations, such as the one
in K.R.S. § 396.205. The Supreme Court explicitly mentioned in Pope that
it had no occasion to consider non-claim statutes "which generally provide
for longer time periods, ranging from one to five years."88
The possibility that K.R.S. § 396.205 could be held to be not self-
executing, because it is triggered by an action of the probate court, could
have a disastrous impact on the personal representative, or, perhaps more
Therefore, we find that... there is no state action involved and Ohio's statute is
a self-executing statute of limitations.").
83 K.R.S. § 396.011(1).
4 Id.
85 Id. § 396.205.
86 See Burnett, 685 N.E.2d at 1111; Gottlieb, 1997 WL 543069, at *2.
87 See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 489 (1988).
81 Id. at 488.
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importantly, the distributees of the estate. The availability of claims by
"known or reasonably ascertainable creditors" who did not receive actual
notice well after the two-year limitations period has expired becomes a
distinct possibility. This could subject a devisee or heir to a suit against the
estate by a creditor with no limitations period to protect such a distributee
except the period applicable to the cause of action against a living person.
Such a result would be inconsistent with the purpose of probate administra-
tion, which is "promot[ing] finality and allow[ing] distributions free of
potential creditor claims." 9 Likewise, long-term statutes of limitations "are
designed to bar all claims against an estate which are brought beyond a
reasonable time."9 Given the duration of the statute of limitations
applicable to some causes of actions, such as a five-year period for injuries
to the rights of the plaintiff not arising under contract or otherwise
enumerated,9' and a fifteen-year limitations period for actions upon a
written contract," this "loophole" may result in the property of the
decedent not being judgment-proof for a number of years.
There is thus potential, in a creditor suit under Kentucky law that
would ordinarily be barred by K.R.S. § 396.205, that the only self-
executing statute of limitations may be a lengthy one attributable to the
particular cause of action of the creditor, and not the shorter limitation
designed specifically for probate administration.93 Such a possibility is
inconsistent with the policy of an expeditious but fair period in which to
close a decedent's estate, allowing heirs or devisees to fully enjoy such
property without being subject to litigation. As was previously mentioned,
K.R.S. § 396.011 contains a provision stating that claims against a
decedent's estate where no personal representative is appointed are barred
unless brought within two years of the decedent's death.94 The disparity
between Kentucky's non-claim limitations period where a personal
representative is appointed and the limitations period where one is not
appointed has been referred to as "puzzling.""
89 Kness, supra note 1, at 365.
9Id. at 367.
91 K.R.S. § 413.120(7) (Michie 1999).921 d. § 413.090(2).
93 See James E. Hargrove & Walter R. Morris, Jr., Claims Against the Estate,
KENTUCKY ESTATE ADMINISTRATION § 9 (Univ. of Ky. Contin. Legal Educ. 3d ed.
2000) (recognizing the possibility of K.R.S. § 396.205 not being self-executing and
allowing a suit against an estate well after this two-year period has run).
94 K.R.S. § 396.011(1) (lvichie 1999); see supra note 73.
9' Hargrove & Morris, supra note 93, § 9.
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V. STATE COURT INTERPRETATIONS
OF STATUTES SIMILAR TO K.R.S. § 396.205
A. Precedent Treating Short and Long-Term Limitations Periods
Differently in Light of Pope
While no Kentucky cases interpret K.R.S. § 396.205,96 other state
courts have interpreted similar provisions. There is authority for the
proposition that, in terms of due process implications, the short-term non-
claim statutes of limitations should be treated differently than long-term
ones.97 In Martel v. Stafford,98 the Vermont court interpreted a two-year
long-term statute of limitations that was triggered by a probate determina-
tion similar to K.R.S. § 396.205. 9 The court declined to allow an action
against the estate of the decedent more than two years after the probate
proceeding that triggered the statute, even though the creditor had no actual
notice and was presumably "known or reasonably ascertainable." 100 Unlike
the Supreme Court in Pope, the Vermont court based its decision on the
much longer length of time involved under the statutory limitations
period.' In its analysis, the Court concluded, "We do not believe that a
diligent plaintiff will fail to discover the death of a potential defendant after
more than two years."10 2
B. Criticism of the Martel Reasoning and Authority For Treating Short
and Long-Term limitations Periods Similarly Under Pope
While the decision of Vermont's high court in Martel may avert a
potentially harsh result, it does not seem to mesh with the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Pope. First, the Vermont Court's distinction between
Martel and Pope appears to be somewhat unprincipled in terms of
constitutional law. That is to say, the same level of state action is involved
" See K.R.S. § 396.205 (Michie's Statutes Annotated contain no annotations
to court decisions considering this section).
9' See Martel v. Stafford, 603 A.2d 345, 350 (Vt. 1991).
98Id.
" Id. at 346 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 557(a) (1973) ("After the
issuance of letters testamentary... such action, if the cause of action survives, may
be commenced... against the executor or administrator within two years, and not
after.")).
100Id. at 351.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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in both cases, whether it is applied to short-term or long-term statutes of
limitations. Under Pope, a plaintiff creditor has been deprived of property
without due process of law if there is sufficient state action and he or she
was known or reasonably ascertainable.0 3 This deprivation apparently
occurs whether he or she learns of this deprivation within six months or two
years. The Martel court's distinction, based on its assertion that a known
or reasonably ascertainable plaintiff instituting a suit after two years is less
diligent than a similar plaintiff instituting a suit at an earlier date 10 4 may be
factually accurate, but it seems irrelevant to the constitutional law question
of whether the former plaintiff is any less deprived of property without due
process of law than the latter.
Allowing two different due process interpretations based on the length
of the limitations period has been criticized elsewhere.0 5 Professor Thomas
Waterbury contends that long-term statutes of limitations that are triggered
by a probate court proceeding may have been permissible "if the Pope
opinion did not rest on a 'state-action' rationale."'0 6 He contends that
"under Pope's 'state-action' rationale.., it is difficult to argue that a long-
term statute that relies on an estate distribution supervised by the court to
bar claims is a 'self-executing' statute of limitations."'0 7 Professor
Waterbury concludes that the solution "is to employ a long-term statute that
bars creditors' claims in traditional fashion--on the expiration of a period
of time following a decedent's death."'08 This period should be both
"reasonably respectful of creditor interests and likely to expire before an
estate is ready for distribution."'19
The assessment of Professor Waterbury--that long-term probate
statutes of limitations should be held to the same constitutional standards
as short-term ones-is consistent with the views of other commentators as
well. For instance, Bruce N. Kness contends that "long term non-claim
statutes must meet the same constitutional standards when applied against
all creditors as the short term non-claim statute does as applied to known
103 Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988).
o4 See Martel, 603 A.2d at 350.
105 Waterbury, supra note 10, at 766.
'06 Id. at 785.
107 Id.
101 Id. at 786.
o Id. Professor Waterbury suggested that the long-term expiration period that
bests serves these interests is the one-year period after the decedent's death. He
notes the reasonableness of requiring creditor suits within this time period and
asserts that most administered estates are not ready for distribution by the
expiration of this one-year period. Id.
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creditors."" 0 The arguments of the above commentators disagree with the
Martel court analysis and follow a principle that the length of the statute
should be inconsequential in terms of the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision inMartel further conflicts with Pope in that Pope was not
decided on the rationale that a creditor was not given a sufficient amount
of time to initiate a claim."' Pope was based on due process considerations,
leading to the conclusion that when state probate proceedings trigger a time
bar, persons without notice of those proceedings who have an expired claim
have been denied property without due process of law. This rationale seems
to apply regardless of the length of the statute.
C. State Court Decisions Applying Pope to Long-Term Limitations
Periods
In addition to the potential problems with the Martel analysis discussed
above, other state courts have interpreted whether a statute of limitations
is self-executing in accordance with the test enumerated in Pope regardless
of whether the time bar is short or long-term. For instance, the Colorado
Court of Appeals, in In re Ongaro,"' interpreted whether a longer term
(one-year) statute of limitations running from the date of the decedent's
death implicated the due process concern outlined in Pope. "' The court was
faced with only precedent from the United States Supreme Court".4 and that
from its own state courts,"5I both of which interpreted short-term non-claim
statutes exclusively. Nevertheless, the Colorado court found the
precedential analysis of these statutes to be controlling with respect to the
statutes of a longer term."' It held that the one-year provision was "a self-
110 Kness, supra note 1, at 367.
"' See Tulsa Prof 1 Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988).
112 In re Ongaro, 973 P.2d 660 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999), aff'd, 998 P.2d 1097
(Colo. 2000).
". Id. (interpreting not the short-term non-claim statute of limitations that
limited claims to a four-month presentation requirement, but the long-term statute
that barred all claims if not presented within one year of death).
"' Id. at 664 (The Colorado court cites Pope, which interprets a non-claim
statute with a two-month time limit.).
"5 Id. at 665 (The Colorado court cites Wishbone, Inc. v. Eppinger, 820 P.2d
434 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), which interprets a non-claim statute with a four-month
time limit.).
16 Id. ("Because we find the reasoning in [Pope] and Eppinger persuasive, we
conclude that no due process violation occurred here.").
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executing nonclaim statute triggered, not by the commencement of probate
proceedings in state court, but rather by the decedent's death.""' 7 It then
reasoned that "unlike a statutory scheme where the nonclaim statute
becomes operative only after probate proceedings have been commenced,
here there is no state involvement, and consequently, by definition, no
violation of due process."
' 18
The decision in Ongaro was ultimately appealed and affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Colorado." 9 The state supreme court reasoned that the
statute in question was self-executing because "[t]he one-year period for
presenting claims begins to run on the day of the decedent's death, not on
the occurrence of an event requiring action by the state."12°
The court of last resort in Maine also held that, under the Pope case,
a three-year probate statute of limitations that was triggered by the death
of the decedent rather than probate court action was self-executing and
thus insufficient state action to implicate due process concerns. 2' While
the action in question was a petition to be named personal representative
and not a claim against an estate, the petitioner claimed she was denied
due process, under Pope, by the three-year statute of limitations for the
application for appointment of personal representative.' 22 The court
found that, "[g]enerally speaking, probate statutes of limitations which
begin running from the date of the death of the decedent, rather than
from a date established by the probate court proceedings, are self-execut-
ing.",23
The Maine Supreme Court's statements that long-term probate sta-
tutes of limitations run from the decedent's death seem to be in tune with
the views of commentators. For instance, John W. Chapman, Jr. explained
that:
[s]tatutes in the second category [long-term statutes] are referred to as
statutes of limitation because the time period is not triggered by court
order. Statutes of limitation differ from nonclaim statutes in that such
statutes usually begin to run at the decedent's death, whether or not a will
is probated or notice of administration has been published. 124
117Id.
118 Id.
I" In re Ongaro, 998 P.2d 1097 (Colo. 2000).
120Id. at 1105.
121 Estate of Kruzynski, 744 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Me. 2000).
1'Id. at 1056-57.
' Id. at 1057.
'24 Chapman, supra note 10, at 473 (footnotes omitted).
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Bruce N. Kness also commented that the "second type of non-claim statute
runs for a longer term of nine months to six years and starts the moment of
the decedent's death."'12 There appears to be a general assumption that such
statutes uniformly run from the death of the decedent rather than from the
actions of the state probate court. On the other hand, Kentucky's long-term
statute, K.R.S. § 396.205, is initiated by probate court action rather than the
decedent's death. 26 The fact that Kentucky's long-term non-claim statute
begins to run at the initiation of probate court action, rather than at the date
of the decedent's death, makes it of questionable validity against a known
or reasonably ascertainable creditor. Without a revision of this statute, the
position of this Note is that there will be nothing to bar suits against an
estate, or more likely at this later date, its beneficiaries, except the
applicable non-probate statute of limitations on the claimant's cause of
action.
It is clear that Kentucky's short-term non-claim statute, K.R.S. §
396.011(1), does not conform to the Pope requirements.' In addition,
there is, at minimum, a strong interpretation question as to whether
Kentucky's long-term non-claim statute, K.R.S. § 396.205, is susceptible
to a due process attack under Pope, even years after the statute should have
run. Because Pope established a "state-action" test, state courts, in deciding
whether or not due process applies, should and often do look to the test in
Pope regardless of the length of the limitations period. The weight of
authority seems to lend credence to an argument that K.R.S. § 396.205 is
likely to be interpreted as a non-self-executing statute and thus subject to
due process attacks under Pope. Given that there is at the very least an
interpretation question on this issue that could result in unnecessary
litigation, the next section of this Note suggests possible avenues of
improvement for Kentucky's non-claim statutes.
VI. AN APPEAL FOR STATUTORY REFORM
A. State Legislative Responses to Pope
As was mentioned earlier, Kentucky's non-claim statute was last
amended within close proximity to the Pope decision. 2 It is unfortunate
that this occurred on the brink of a new constitutional requirement that
'25 Kness, supra note 1, at 365.
'2 See K.R.S. § 396.205 (Michie Supp. 2001).
127 See supra notes 81-83 and corresponding text.
2 See supra notes 65-66 and corresponding text.
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raises serious questions as to whether the existing statutory formation
would carry out the true intention of the state legislature. In the year
following the Pope decision, the state of Maryland amended its non-claim
limitation period with the effect of making the statute self-executing." 9 The
prior statute was almost identical to Kentucky's short-term limitations
period, found in K.R.S. § 396.011, in that it barred claims not presented
within six months of the appointment of the personal representative.i3 The
new statute's language triggers the running of the six-month limitations
period from the date of the decedent's death.' 3' In keeping with the.
consistent interpretation of state court cases after Pope, Maryland courts
have held that the new statute is self-executing and therefore does not
implicate due process.
13 1
A similar legislative response was undertaken in Ohio. Ohio amended
its non-claim statute in 1990 to include a prohibition on claims not
presented within one year of the decedent's death. 33 The Ohio legislature
implemented this revision, at the suggestion of the Ohio Supreme Court, to
eliminate the "state action" elements that subjected the former time bar to
due process attacks.'34 Thus, courts have construed Ohio's new limitations
period accordingly, holding that it is self-executing and not subject to the
Pope requirements.3 5
Indiana took a similar approach to Ohio and Maryland in 2001. The
amended non-claim statute 3 6 eliminated the aspects triggered by court
involvement and included a provision to bar claims with a time period
running from the decedent's death. 37 In 1988, California repealed its
former non-claim statute 3 1 to provide that a creditor must file a suit against
the estate before the later of four months from the appointment of the
personal representative or from sixty days after notice of administration is
given to the creditor.'3 9 Michigan also amended its non-claim statute in
129 Lampton v. LaHood, 617 A.2d 1142, 1148 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (citing
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 8-103(a) (1989)).
130 Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 8-103(a) (1973)).
131 Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 8-103(a) (1989)).
132 See, e.g., id. at 1142; Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hallowell, 617 A.2d 1134
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.06(B) (Anderson 1998).
134 Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Action Indus., 178 B.R. 692, 697 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
135 E.g., id.
136 IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-14-1(d) (Michie Supp. 2001).
137 Estate of Decker, 684 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (Ind. 1997).
138 CAL. PROB. CODE § 700 (repealed 1988).
391 Id. § 9100 (West 1991 & Supp. 2002).
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response to Pope. Its former statute 4 ° was modified in favor of a scheme
similar to that of the Uniform Probate Code. 4' Michigan's new statute
provides for a four-month limitations period, if notice is received, that runs
from the appointment of the personal representative. If such notice is not
received, then there is a three-year limitations period that runs from the
decedent's death.' Finally, Missouri also altered its statutory scheme by
enacting a statute that forecloses all claims that are not filed within one
year of the decedent's death, regardless of when or if a personal representa-
tive is appointed.'43
B. The Uniform Probate Code's Response
The Uniform Probate Code adopted a hybrid approach in its non-claim
statute.'" The 1989 amendment bars claims against the decedent's estate
that are not presented within one year of the decedent's death.'45 The
second part of the Uniform Probate Code approach allows a personal
representative to mail or otherwise deliver notice to a creditor of a decedent
that the claim will be barred on the occurrence of the later of four months
after publication notice or sixty days after mail or delivery notice. 46 Thus,
this approach has a self-executing component that bars claims not brought
within a relatively lengthy one-year period and a non-self-executing
component that, subject to actual notice which takes away a due process
concern, allows the limitations period to be much shorter than one year.
C. The Advantages of the Above Statutes Compared to Kentucky's
Provision
Statutes such as the ones enacted by Maryland, Ohio, Indiana, and the
Uniform Probate Code, eliminate potential due process problems under
Pope that arise under Kentucky's current statutory system. Legislative
revision would be beneficial in eliminating the potential problems of
existing Kentucky law. The question is, which statutory construction better
conforms to the goals of the legislature? Kentucky's current system
'4 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.735 (repealed 1988).
141 See infra notes 144-46 and corresponding text.
'42 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN § 700.3803 (West 2002).
'43 Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.444 (1992).
'"See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (amended 1997).
141 Id. § 3-803(a)(1).
'46d. §§ 3-803(a)(2), 3-801.
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includes both short and long-term statutes. Maryland, Ohio, and Indiana
simply impose a one-year "middle-length" statute that bars all claims, but
this system may not be best in light of the Kentucky legislature's presumed
intention to expedite the probate process with its 1988 revisions.'47 The
legislature may wish to keep the current system, consisting of a short and
long-term limitations period, to allow claims in certain defined categories
to be promptly barred. This could be achieved through the enactment of a
statute similar to the Uniform Probate Code.
States have generally employed two different statutory schemes in
order to conform their probate non-claim statutes to the requirements of due
process as outlined in Pope. The first method is to discard the notions of
long and short-term limitations periods and enact one medium-term period,
typically one year, which runs from the death of the decedent. 4 While
these statutes have been held to conform to the due process notice
requirements of Pope,"9 commentators have noted the intrinsic unfairness
of such statutes to creditors and a possible amenability to a due process
attack on another ground. 5 Professor Mark Reutlinger observed that in
order to obviate the application of the Pope decision, many states have
simply shortened the length of the long-term statutes and combined them
with their short-term statutes. 5 ' While this rectifies the Pope due process
concerns, Professor Reutlinger argued that it is not the proper statutory
policy to enact.' He contended that a one-year bar from the date of the
decedent's death is insufficient time for some creditors to learn of the
decedent's death and present a claim.'53 Finally, Professor Reutlinger
predicted that as non-claim statutes that run from the death of the decedent
grow shorter, they may eventually be attacked on due process grounds as
allowing insufficient time to present a claim and therefore denying property
rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'54
The other method states employ in revising their statutes to comply
with Pope's mandate is the inclusion of a short and long-term provi-'
"I K.R.S. § 396.011 (Michie 1999). The 1998 revisions to K.R.S. ch. 396
reduced the time allowed for claim presentation from one year to six months.
'4 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.06(B) (Anderson 1998).
141 See, e.g., Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Action Indus., 178 B.R. 692, 697 (W.D. Pa.
1995).
50 See, e.g., Mark Reutlinger, State Action, Due Process, and the New
Nonclaim Statutes: Can No Notice Be Good Notice If Some Notice Is Not?, 24
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 433 (1990).
Id. at 440.
'5 See id. at 467-68.
' Id. at 467.
" Id. at 454.
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sion.'55 These provisions are similar to the Uniform Probate Code in that
they provide an expedited claims period for creditors who have received
actual notice. There is also a long-term period, generally two or three years
from the decedent's death, which catches all other claims in which actual
notice was not received. In light of the concerns Professor Reutlinger
expressed concerning the combined statutes,'56 and the Kentucky legisla-
ture's presumed intent to provide both short and long-term statutes,'
Kentucky should revise its statute in this manner, retaining both a short and
long-term non-claim provision.
D. Revising Kentucky's Short-Term Statute
According to Professor Waterbury, "[t]he goal of revising short-term
statutes should be to effect compliance with Pope's 'actual notice'
requirement while minimizing the negative impact of such compliance on
prompt, efficient, and economical estate settlement."'58 In light of this goal,
the legislature may want to consider a short-term statute similar to the
approach taken in the Uniform Probate Code that allows the personal
representative to elect to shorten the generally applicable statute of
limitations to claims against the decedent's estate, provided the representa-
tive complies with a statutorily defined actual notice requirement to the
creditor.'59 This short-term statute will not offend the due process
requirements of Pope because it will only apply once actual notice is
given."' ° This provision should run from the date of the receipt of notice
and should be a few months in duration.
E. Revising Kentucky's Long-Term Statute
Kentucky should then amend its long-term statute' 6' to a time period
the legislature feels best balances the interests of all parties 162 and begins
to run at the death of the decedent. Limitations periods that trigger the time
bar at death have consistently been held by state courts interpreting Pope
' See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3803 (West 2002).
156 See Reutlinger, supra note 150, at 433.
'.. See K.R.S. § 396.011(1) (Michie 1999).
158 Waterbury, supra note 10, at 774-75.
'59 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-803(a)(2), 3-801 (amended 1997).
160 See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
161 K.R.S. § 396.205.
'62 See Waterbury, supra note 10, at 774 (noting that such statutes generally run
from one to five years).
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to be self-executing and not subject to the notice requirement.'63 Such a
statutory construction will prevent situations that have arisen in other states
where there is a constitutional attack under Pope that allows a claim to be
presented well after the state legislature has determined that such a claim
should be barred.
CONCLUSION
The Pope decision is pertinent to Kentucky's non-claim provisions for
two reasons. First, it was decided during approximately the same time-
period that the state legislature last amended its chapter governing claims
against the decedent's estate." Second, Kentucky's statutory scheme is
such that both the short 6' and long-term16 provisions run from the action
of the probate court, and therefore implicate the due process concern
enumerated in Pope. In light of the litigation 67 and statutory 6 revisions
concerning these statutes in other states, legislative revision in Kentucky
that takes into account the interests of the creditors and the estate beneficia-
ries, as well as the efficiency of the probate process, should be undertaken.
163 See Bumett v. Villaneuve, 685 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Fifth
Third Bank v. Gottlieb, No. WD-96-054, 1997 WL 543069 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
27, 1997).
'6 K.R.S. ch. 396.
165 Id. § 396.01 1(1).
166 Id. § 396.205.
167 See generally In re Estate of McDowell, 777 P.2d 826 (Kan. 1989); In re
Estate of Barthel, 468 N.W.2d 689 (Wis. 1991).
168 See generally CAL. PROB. CODE § 9100 (West 1991 & Supp. 2002); MICH.
COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 700.3803 (West 2002).
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